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I. INTRODUCTION
"On each landing, opposite the lift shaft, the poster with the enormous
face gazed from the wall. It was one of those pictures which are so contrived
that the eyes follow you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
You, the caption beneath it ran."'
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 5 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961).
GEORGE ORWELL was the pen name of an Englishman named Eric Blair. He was
born in Bengal in 1903, educated at Eton, and after service with the Indian Impe-
rial Police in Burma, returned to Europe to earn his living writing novels and es-
says. He was essentially a political writer who wrote of his own times, a man of
intense feelings and fierce hates. He hated totalitarianism, and served in the
1
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As we approach the twenty-first century, the Orwellian visions depicted
in 1984 seep into our collective consciousness. Has Orwell's nightmare
become today's reality? Some would argue that it has.2
The increased use of computers, coupled with the advent of cyberspace
and the Internet, catapults the criminal defense attorney into a legal arena
undreamed of a short time ago. Various sorts of crimes can occur in cyber-
space,3 and as such, criminal procedure issues arising under the Fourth
Amendment lurk in the background.
The Fourth Amendment ensures that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... If law enforcement
officials violate one's Fourth Amendment rights in the process of searching
or seizing evidence, the defendant can move to suppress the evidence.
5
However, in order to assert one's Fourth Amendment rights and exclude
evidence, the defendant must have standing.
6
Loyalist forces in the Spanish Civil War. He was critical of communism but
considered himself a Socialist. He hated intellectuals, although he was a literary
critic. He hated cant and lying and cruelty in life and in literature. He died at
forty-seven of a neglected lung ailment, leaving behind a substantial body of
work, a growing reputation for greatness, and the conviction that modem man
was inadequate to cope with the demands of his history.
Preface to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961) (emphasis added).
2. To connect with others who share the view that we presently exist in an Orwellian
world, venture online and see, EPIC (visited Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.epic.org./privacy>.
3. See discussion infra Part III.A.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
5. JosHUrA DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 109, at 219 (1991). The
notion that evidence illegally obtained can be suppressed at trial sprung from the celebrated
case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Court decided that because
the government's conduct circumvented the Fourth Amendment when officials forced a citizen
to disclose certain incriminating papers, such evidence was inadmissible at trial against the
defendant. Id. at 631-32 The use of general warrants and writs of assistance, devices
employed by agents of the crown in England to rifle through homes of its citizens in an effort
to search for evidence, weighed heavily on the minds of the nine justices in Boyd. See
generally id. Accordingly, the development of the exclusionary rule began. See discussion
infra Part II (providing further analysis of the exclusionary rule and its application to the
standing doctrine). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled sub nom. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled sub nom. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The aforementioned cases outline the chronological develop-
ment of the exclusionary rule.
6. DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 109, at 219. See also discussion infra Part II.A.-E.
942 [Vol. 21:941
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For purposes of determining whether a defendant may challenge the
unconstitutionality of a search and seizure, standing is a threshold question.7
This note will focus on what constitutes standing for a motion to suppress
evidence searched and/or seized in cyberspace. First, the evolution of
standing jurisprudence will be discussed. Second, the federal wiretapping
statutes will be examined to determine whether they can shed light on this
issue. Third, as there are no cases directly on point which focus on standing
under the Fourth Amendment and the Internet, two fictional characters,
whom you will meet shortly, will take us on various hypothetical journeys
through cyberspace and Fourth Amendment analysis.8
II. WHAT IS STANDING?
When a defendant challenges the admission of evidence in a criminal
case on the premise that it was secured in violation of her Fourth Amend-
ment rights, she must be a party entitled to do so. 9 If the defendant is so
entitled, then she has "standing" to move to suppress the evidence vis-a-vis
the exclusionary rule.10 The exclusionary rule usually provides that when
evidence is unconstitutionally attained, it is inadmissible in criminal pro-
ceedings against the person whose rights were violated." This brings us to
7. See discussion infra Part 11.B (explaining Jones, Rakas, their progeny, and the Court's
current stance on standing jurisprudence as a starting point for analysis under the Fourth
Amendment).
8. Intriguing criminal cases may flow from the recent Heaven's Gate cult mass suicide.
Aside from the cult members' plans to board the mothership they believed to be trailing the
Hale-Bopp Comet, a central feature of this peculiar cult was its web site, the "Heavens Gate."
(The web site no longer exists.) Will the Heaven's Gate web site prompt legal discussion
concerning the Internet and the Fourth Amendment? For interesting discussions concerning
the impact of the cult's activity on the Internet, see Robert J. Hawkins & Matt Miller, Cult
Suicide in Rancho Sante Fe: Mass Suicide News Circles the World at Net Speed, SAN DIEGO
UNION & TRm., Apr. 1, 1997, at 12 (Computer Link Section); Sandi Dolbee, Cult Suicide in
Rancho Sante Fe: 18-year-old Recounts His Internet Visit with Cultist Sandi Dolbee, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRm., Mar. 30, 1997, at Al; and James Lileks, Cult Suicide in Rancho Sante
Fe: Death Cult Fantasy Disguised as Religion Drove Heaven's Gate Cultists to Delusion, and
Ultimately to Self-Destruction; 'New Age' Indulgence Led Odd People to Bizarre End, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRm., Apr. 1, 1997, at G1.
9. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.1, at 459-60 (1992).
10. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 219.
11. Id. at 235. However, if police officers, in good faith, reasonably rely on what is later
determined to be an invalid warrant, the evidence may be used against the defendant at his or
her trial. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon firmly established the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 249-50. See also
United States v. Haven, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
1997]
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the central issue: When does the defendant have standing; in other words,
when is one entitled to challenge the admission of evidence on grounds that
the search and seizure contravened the Fourth Amendment?
A. Katz v. United States
The linchpin for standing, and Fourth Amendment examination in
general, hinges on Katz v. United States.12 When Charles Katz called in his
wagers from a public telephone booth in Los Angeles, BIG BROTHER was
listening. Without a warrant, FBI agents surreptitiously attached electronic
listening and recording devices to the outside portion of the booth where Mr.
Katz placed his calls.' 3
Prior to the Katz decision, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence encom-
passed the rationale that physical penetration or trespass into a
"constitutionally protected area" was necessary for governmental conduct to
rise to the level of a violation under the Fourth Amendment. 14 The logical
implication of this standard translated into a legal principle which espoused
a property based model for determining whether a defendant had standing.
15
Thus, before Katz, standing was invariably entwined with the Court's
property based approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' 6
It therefore came as no surprise that the government in Katz argued no
search occurred because there was no physical trespass into the phone booth
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
These cases discuss the chronological development of the exception to the exclusionary rule
for purposes of impeaching a defendant's credibility. See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule which states
that evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible because of an unconstitutional search or
seizure transforms into admissible evidence if in the final analysis, the evidence would have
been lawfully discovered independent of the initial bad search or seizure).
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Id. at 348-49. The physical location of the listening device, the outside portion of the
phone booth, is meaningful in that the Court's Fourth Amendment philosophy, up to this point
in history, hinged on whether there was physical penetration into a "constitutionally protected
area." If the Court adhered to its prior rationale, there could not be a Fourth Amendment
violation in Katz because the listening device did not actually penetrate any of the four walls
of the phone booth.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, government agents
intercepted the defendant's phone conversations without any physical trespass into the
defendant's home. The Court deduced that without a physical trespass, no search of a place
could have occurred under the rubric of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 466.
15. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
11.3, at 118 (1996).
16. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 56.
[Vol. 21:941
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where Mr. Katz called in his bets.17 Katz was convicted, and the district
court, as well as the court of appeals, agreed on admitting the tape recorded
evidence.18 Both lower courts relied on the logic of Olmstead v. United
States and its progeny, ruling that no violation occurred because there was
no physical invasion of the phone booth where Mr. Katz placed his calls.
19
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, rejected the trespass rationale
stemming from Olmstead, stating the now oft-quoted phrase that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 20 His opinion, read together with
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, formed the crux for future Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.21 Standing would no longer be contingent upon
whether there was a physical intrusion into the area being searched. Justice
Harlan's concurrence advocated a two prong test: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
22
While the subjective prong is no longer critical to the overall calculus for
determining whether one has standing, both prongs still must be satisfied.
In fact, some contend that "inquiry into the particular defendant's subjective
state of mind has no place in the application of the Katz expectation of
privacy standard." 24 The focus of the objective prong examines what types
of self-protective steps were taken by the individual to ensure that his or her
activities would remain private.2 Were those self-protective steps sufficient
to justify a reasonable person in believing that his or her activity would be
free from uninvited eyes or ears? One who knowingly exposes her activities
to the public or acts in plain view, cannot be said to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.26 In the same vein, the Fourth Amendment does not
protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides information will not reveal it to the government.27
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
18. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir.), 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Id at 133.
20. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Individual privacy (it was thought), not the arbitrary location
of a listening device, would be the detrimental factor for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 248.
21. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 58-59.
22. Katz, 398 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 60.
24. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3(c), at 157.
25. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 63.
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
27. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Although Hoffa was not grounded
precisely on the standing issue, its logic is certainly relevant to the overall calculus as to
whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is because "the Fourth Amendment
1997]
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Applying this test to the facts in Katz, we can easily see why the FBI
surveillance constituted a search. First, Katz must have had an actual
expectation of privacy when he placed the call in the phone booth. Katz did
not know the phone booth was being monitored by the FBI; therefore, when
he picked up the phone, he had an actual expectation of privacy. Second,
Katz stepped into the phone booth and shut the door behind him before
placing his calls. He took adequate self-protective steps. Justice Stewart
points out that he did this to exclude the "uninvited ear.",28  "One who
occupies it [the phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.,
29
Despite abandoning the trespass rationale grounded in Olmstead, the
Court will sometimes utilize property concepts for purposes of standing
analysis.30 However, the Court is often weary of a property-based approach
to standing and prefers to tailor its reasoning to the Katz expectation of
privacy test. 31 Nevertheless, the property-based rationale can be reconciled
with the approach Katz takes.32
The fundamental inquiry regarding standing to object to a search is
that articulated in [Katz and] Mancusi: whether the conduct which
the defendant wants to put in issue involved an intrusion into his
reasonable expectation of privacy. In resolving that question, it is
useful to consider the factors which the Court has on other occa-
sions alluded to-whether the defendant had an interest in the place
searched, whether he had an interest in the items seized, and
[does not] protect[] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Id. at 302. This simple but crucial line of
reasoning will play an important role in the system operator/user relationship on the Internet
for purposes of determining whether the user has standing to object to evidence obtained in
cyberspace. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.-F.
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
29. Id.
30. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3, at 118. "[S]tanding may be acquired by having a
'proprietary or possessory interest in the premises' which were searched .... Id. (quoting
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973)).
31. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The Court held that the "capacity to
claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the
invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation
of freedom from governmental intrusion." Id. at 368.
32. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3, at 119.
946 [Vol. 21:941
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whether the search occurred at a place where he was lawfully pres-
ent.
33
Thus, while physical trespass is not dispositive on the issue of standing, the
utilization of property concepts will aid in the determination of whether a
particular defendant has standing.
B. Jones, Rakas, and Their Progeny
Rakas v. Illinois3a is considered the leading modem Supreme Court case
for standing under the Fourth Amendment.35 In Rakas, police officers pulled
over an automobile which matched the description of a vehicle used in a
robbery.36 They searched the car and found evidence of the robbery,
including a sawed-off shotgun underneath the front passenger seat and rifle
shells in a locked glove compartment.37 The defendant, a passenger, moved
to exclude the evidence on grounds that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.38 Relying on the Court's 1960 decision in Jones v.
United States, 39 the defendant contended he had standing to contest the
search because he was "'legitimately on [the] premises"' when the police
examined the car.40
In Jones, the defendant, a guest at another's apartment, was present
when police searched the apartment and found contraband.4 ' The defendant
testified that the apartment belonged to a friend who had given him a key
and permission to use the apartment. 42 Under its interpretation of Rule 41(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,43 the Court announced that
33. Id. (footnote omitted).
34. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
35. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 224.
36. 439 U.S. at 130.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled sub nor. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980).
40. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 (alteration in original).
41. 362 U.S. at 259.
42. Id.
43. Rule 41 states:
(e) Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court
for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on
the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The
court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the
motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant,
although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and the use of
1997]
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"anyone legitimately on premises" at the time of the search qualified "as a
'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" '44 and had standing to
move to suppress the evidence. Lower courts utilized this "legitimately on
premises" rationale as a basis for determining whether a defendant had
standing under the Fourth Amendment.46
The Court dismissed that line of logic in Rakas,47 and instead couched
its language for standing in terms of the doctrine espoused in Katz: Does the
individual have a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place?, 48
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a 5-4 majority, conservatively construed the
following rationale found in Alderman v. United States:49 "'Fourth Amend-
ment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights,
may not be vicariously asserted."' 50
Despite retreating from the "legitimately on premises" rationale
grounded in Jones, the Court upheld the lower court's holding through the
the property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is
made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or infor-
mation is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (emphasis added).
44. Jones, 362 U.S. at 261 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)).
45. Id. at 267.
46. See State v. Porter, 324 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Tasco,
323 A.2d 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974); State v. Simms, 516 P.2d 1088 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
These cases all hold that guests who were legitimately on premises have standing to challenge
the admission of evidence to be used against them.
47. This will prove to be important because an Internet user who is at a website with the
system operator's permission (legitimately on premises) may not automatically attain standing
to challenge evidence searched and seized in cyberspace. See discussion infra Part IV.
48. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
49. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, the Court crystallized the contention that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal:
There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to pro-
tect the rights of another.... What petitioners appear to assert is an independent
constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative evidence be-
cause it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But we
think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between pre-
venting the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally
seized from him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot
claim this predicate for exclusion.
Id. at 174. This argument is vital to understanding the predicament of the online user and her
relationship with the system operator. A user may not be able to assert a Fourth Amendment
violation if only the system operator's rights are violated. See discussion infra parts IV.A.-F.
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use of the Katz framework51 and some crafty post hoc analysis. Thus, the
Court did not directly overrule the "legitimately on premises" rationale in all
cases. Rather, this factor should be considered in conjunction with a
determination as to whether the particular defendant's situation parallels the
circumstances in Jones. The Court reasoned that Rakas, though legitimately
on the premises (in the car), did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
similar to Jones. Unlike Rakas, Jones had a key to the apartment, clothes in
the closet, and had previously slept on the premises. 2 Those facts indicate
complete dominion and control and the power to exclude others from the
apartment.53 "[D]ominion and control" and the power to exclude others are
integral components of the objective prong to the Katz test.54 The key Jones
possessed, in addition to the clothes he stored in the apartment, were
sufficient indicia of control to warrant an expectation of privacy that
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 55 The Court also eluci-
dated that because the right to exclude others invariably flows from the
ownership or lawful possession of real or personal property, one who has
such a possessory interest will probably have a legitimate expectation of
privacy stemming from that right to exclude.
5 6
Unlike Katz and Jones, Rakas did not have any indicia of control:57
Katz occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all
others, and paid the toll.58 "Except with respect to his friend, Jones had
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others
from it."59 Here, Rakas simply could not prove he had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy as a mere passenger in an automobile contesting the search of
51. Id. at 141. Why did the Court retreat from the "legitimately on premises" rationale
found in Jones?
[The holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that Jones had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using and therefore could
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental
invasion of those premises, even though his "interest" in those premises might
not have been a recognized property interest at common law.
Id at 143.
52. Id at 141.
53. Id at 143-44 n.12.
54. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149.
55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
56. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
57. Essentially, Rakas could not legitimately exclude others from the automobile because
he did not have a possessory interest in it. See discussion supra notes 54-56 and accompa-
nying text.
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contraband found under the seat and in a glove compartment. 6° Therefore,
Rakas did not have standing to assert the illegality of the search in an
attempt to suppress the evidence seized.6'
Interwoven within standing analysis under the Fourth Amendment is the
issue of whether a search has occurred. Because the Fourth Amendment
only protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, it could not come
into play with out a search. To determine whether government activity rises
to the level of a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, one
must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area examined.62
Essentially, this is the same test used to determine whether a defendant has
standing to challenge the admission of evidence. The basic similarity
between the tests for standing and determining whether a search occurred led
Justice Rehnquist to opine in Rakas: "The inquiry under either approach is
the same. But we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent
of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than
on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of stand-
ing."6
3
Despite Justice Rehnquist's position, two years later, in Rawlings v.
Kentucky,64 Justice Blackmun contended:
[T]hat these two inquiries [standing and whether a substantive
Fourth Amendment 'search' occurred] 'merge into one' in the
sense that both are to be addressed under the principles of Fourth
Amendment analysis developed in Katz v. United States and its
progeny. But I do not read... Rakas[] as holding that it is im-
proper for lower courts to treat these inquiries as distinct compo-
nents of a Fourth Amendment claim.
65
60. Id. Arguably if Rakas has a key to the car, he would have had standing.
61. Id.
62. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 (footnote omitted).
64. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
65. Id. at 112 (Blackmun J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Rawlings, the defendant
was the unsuspecting guest at the house of one Marcuess who had the misfortune of being
present when the police searched the Marcuess home without a warrant. Apparently, seconds
before the police arrived, the defendant stuffed some 1,800 tablets of LSD and other drugs
into another guest's (Vannessa Cox) purse. Although the defendant had a possessory interest
in the contraband seized, the Court concluded that he did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in Cox's purse. Id. at 105-06. Defendant could not exclude others from Cox's purse
and had no dominion and control over it. Id. Thus, the defendant did not have standing. Id.
One can foresee the applicability of Rawlings on the Internet. The fact that one might have a
[Vol. 21:941
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Justice Blackmun pointed out that it is possible for a defendant to have
standing but lose on the merits.6 Conversely, one could win on the merits
yet have no legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of standing.67 In
the final analysis, however, if the defendant loses either the standing issue or
on the merits, the evidence will be admissible. To successfully win a motion
to suppress evidence, one must have standing and there must be a "search"
under substantive Fourth Amendment analysis.68
C. Hotels, Motels, Tenants, and the Transfer of Property
Does an individual have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
leasehold, hotel, or motel room when he or she is not there at the time of the
government search?69 At first blush, some might contend that because the
hotel or motel manager has a possessory interest in the establishment, as well
as the potential to access its rooms, one cannot have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Such an argument necessarily encompasses a rationale that
the landlord or manager can validly consent to a government agent's request
to search the tenant's or guest's premises. This sort of argument has been
consistently rejected by courts facing the issue.
Courts have determined that those tenants,70 hotel guests,7' and motel
guests72 with a present possessory interest in the premises searched all have
possessory interest in one's electronic mail does not necessarily mean one will have standing.
If one lacks dominion and control or the power to exclude others from their electronic mail,
the possessory interest in it becomes irrelevant.
66. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.
67. Id.
68. It is useful to examine cases stemming from both of these issues to assess their appli-
cability to the Internet. See also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (rejecting the
automatic standing doctrine for possession offenses and developing the chronological analysis
under the standing doctrine). Salvucci sheds light on Rakas. Interview with Professor Mark
Dobson, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center (Feb. 18, 1997).
69. Standing in these types of situations is important because some will contend that the
relationship between a user and her system operator is the functional equivalent of the hotel
guest and manager relationship. If these types of relationships are indeed analogs of each
other, then the case for standing in cyberspace dramatically improves because hotel and motel
guests typically have standing to assert the illegality of a search. See infra Part IV (providing
additional discussion on this argument).
70. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); United States v. Ford, 34
F.3d 992 (1 th Cir. 1994). These cases stand for the proposition that one with a leasehold
interest (as opposed to ownership) has standing to challenge a government search. Under a
Katz-Mancusi analysis, a defendant would have a legitimate expectation of privacy for
purposes of standing. See LAFAvE, supra note 15, § 11.3(a), at 122.
71. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); State v. Jackson, 210 N.W.2d
537 (Iowa 1973). Both cases hold that the consent of a hotel clerk obtained by police to
search defendant's room was invalid. Under a Katz-Mancusi analysis, the defendant would
1997]
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standing to challenge evidence obtained by the government. 73 Thus, manag-
ers and landlords may not always effectively consent to the search of their
tenants rooms. For example, tenants and paying guests could effectively
consent with their landlords or managers to allow the police to search their
rooms. Such consent would obliterate the legitimate expectation of privacy
necessary for standing.
D. Self-Protective Steps and Modem Technology
What constitutes a self-protective step that would rise to the level of a
reasonable expectation of privacy? Technology has advanced to a point
where activities once considered private are, for purposes of standing
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment, "broadcast to the world.' 74
In Smith v. Maryland,75 the Court ruled that the defendant had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed from his
home.76 Police used a device called a pen register to monitor the electrical
impulses coming from the defendant's phone in order to compile a list of the
numbers he called.77  The Court applied Katz and determined that the
defendant probably could not have an actual expectation of privacy in the
phone numbers he dialed because he knowingly divulged that information to
the telephone company. 78 Second, assuming arguendo one did have an
actual expectation of privacy in the phone number she dialed, such an
expectation could not be reasonable.79 Following the line of logic in Hoffa
and it's progeny, one who voluntarily conveys information to a third party
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 80 Katz was distinguished
on the ground that pen registers do not disclose the contents of one's
conversations, only the numbers dialed.8' Where one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of her conversation, she does not with
have a legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of standing. See LAFAVE, supra note 15,
§ 11.3(a), at 122.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 177-78 n.6 (9th Cir. 1971)
(relying on Jones in order to deduce that a motel guest has standing). Utilizing the Katz-
Mancusi analysis, a defendant in a motel room would have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in such premises for purposes of standing. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3(a), at 122.
73. See generally LAFAvE, supra note 15, § 11.3(a).
74. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
75. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
76. Id. at 742.
77. Id. at736n.1.
78. Id. at 742.
79. Id. at 743.
80. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
81. Id. at 741.
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the numbers she dialed.82 The phone company must track the phone num-
bers dialed for purposes of billing.83 A phone company does not have a
similar need for the contents of the user's communications." Therefore, a
defendant like Smith will not have standing to assert the illegality of a search
for phone numbers dialed.
The use of beepers to track a suspect's movements is not considered a
search under constitutional analysis if the information it communicates is
available to the general public, or if such information could be gathered from
an area where one is legally entitled to watch. If information is secured
through the use of a beeper from an area not within the public's view, then
such activity is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.
86
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,87 the Court held that no search
occurred when the government engaged in aerial photography to secure
pictures of an industrial complex. 88 Although Dow Chemical Company
constructed walls around their complex preventing ground-level view,89 such
self-protective steps were not legally sufficient.90 Because the plane's
surveillance occurred from public navigable airspace and was not physically
intrusive, the self-protective steps taken by Dow were rendered meaningless
because they did not cloak what could be seen from above.91 The Court
noted in dictum that the use of "highly sophisticated surveillance not
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology," 92 might
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The dissent pointed out the fallacious logic in the majority opinion:
How could the $22,000, precision aerial mapping camera the government
used be considered readily available to the public? 93 Who would purchase
such a device? From Dow Chemical, it would seem that if sense-enhancing
technology is available (like a precision aerial mapping camera), then the use
of it can not be considered a search. However, the use of sense-creation
devices (like satellite technology) probably would constitute a search under
82. Id.
83. Id at 744.
84. Id-
85. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
86. Id.
87. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id at 229.
90. Id. at 239.
91. Id. at 238-39.
92. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238.
93. Id at 251 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the Fourth Amendment. What one knowingly exposes to the public must be
done at one's peril. If BIG BROTHER can potentially watch from a public
view, he can legally watch.
One other case of note, California v. Greenwood,94 holds that one
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her
garbage left at the side of the curb.95 The Court cited to both Katz and
Smith, reasoning that garbage is knowingly exposed to the public and
voluntarily turned over to a third party (the garbage collector).96 The crux of
Greenwood in reality went further than Katz and Smith. Greenwood only
knowingly exposed opaque garbage bags to the public, not the contents
inside the bag. The majority worked around this obstacle by reasoning that
"[ilt is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public." 97  Thus, one cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he discards at curbside.
The Court "emphasized instead that the Fourth Amendment analysis must
turn on such factors as 'our societal understanding that certain areas deserve
the most scrupulous protection from government invasion."'
98
The Court also reasoned that a California law declaring the search of
trash illegal, and providing for use of the exclusionary rule as a means of
remedying such illegality, does not allow an individual's expectation of
privacy to rise to the level of a "reasonable" one under the Fourth Amend-
ment.99 State law does not define whether one has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 1°° Similarly, in a case where police broke the law and trespassed
on the defendant's property to search for marijuana, despite "no trespassing"
signs, the Court held that one could not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy because the area invaded was an open field.1 1
94. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id. at 40.
97. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). The garbage ultimately goes to the dump
where people, along with thousands of vultures, can view and peck at the contents of
everyone's rubbish. Say au revoir to any reasonable expectation of privacy!
98. Id. at 43. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)). The Court
now seems to be injecting society's common knowledge and understanding into the calculus
of what constitutes a legitimate expectation of privacy.
99. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43.
100. Id.
101. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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E. Flaws in the Federal Wiretapping Statutes
In 1986, Congress revamped federal wiretapping statutes to include the
prohibition on the interception of electronic communications.10 2 Commonly
known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA'), °3 this
statute purports to govern the procedures for obtaining information online.
As with many statutes, the ECPA is riddled with exceptions.
1 4
Section 2510(12) defines an "electronic communication" as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system."105 Although the ECPA prohibits
the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions, 1°6 it permits any person "to intercept or access an electronic communi-
cation made through an electronic communication system that is configured
so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general
public." 107 This language encompasses the rationale in Katz and authorizes
the interception of those electronic communications knowingly exposed to
the public.
The ECPA also carves out an exception permitting one to disclose the
contents of electronic communications "which were inadvertently obtained
by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a
102. LANCE RosE, NETLAW: YOUR RIGrs IN um ONuNE WORLD 167 (1995) [hereinafter
NErLAW].
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
104. It should also be noted that there are no cases which apply the ECPA to a situation
involving the interception of communications in cyberspace.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). Not included in the definition of an electronic communica-
tion is a wire or oral communication. See id. § 2510(12)(A).
"[W]ire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furished
or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for
the transmission of... communications ....
Id. § 2510(1). "'[O]ral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication." Id. § 2510(2). These definitions will prove to be important because the
ECPA only authorizes the suppression of evidence when oral and wire communications are
intercepted.
106. Md2 § 2511 (1994).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
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crime, if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency. ' 1°s Thus, if
the service provider "inadvertently" stumbles across some evidence tending
to incriminate her user, she may divulge the contents of the user's communi-
cations to the police. The crux of the ECPA, as it pertains to the prohibition
on divulging the contents of an electronic communication, is found in
section 2511 (3)(a) which states that
a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to
the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any com-
munication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent
thereof) while in transmission on that service to any person or en-
tity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communi-
cation or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient. 109
The words "while in transmission" are crucial to understanding the ECPA.
Because the ECPA only protects against the divulging of communications
"while in transmission," it is logical to deduce that stored messages are
beyond the reach of the statute.
[T]he ECPA does not give online system users an automatic right
of privacy from system operators for stored messages. Since a
system can easily be configured to store all messages that pass
through it, the ability to review stored messages effectively gives
the operator the ability to review all messages passing through the
system.110
Of course, a provider of an electronic communication service may
divulge the contents of electronic communications if he or she has been
provided with "a court order directing such assistance signed by the author-
izing judge."'' A properly executed warrant authorizes the service provider
to assist law enforcement officials in intercepting electronic communica-
tions.
Assuming arguendo the electronic communication is "in transmission"
within the meaning of section 2511(3)(a), it remains unclear whether one
will be able to remedy the interception of such communications through a
108. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv).
109. Id. § 2511(3)(a) (emphasis added).
110. NETLAW, supra note 102, at 168. The ECPA would prohibit the interception and
disclosure of electronic messages sent in live or real-time transmission. Id.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A).
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motion to suppress evidence. Section 2515112 only prohibits the use of
evidence of intercepted wire or oral communications.11 3 This section does
not mention an "electronic communication" as a type of communication
which would require the prohibition of its use as evidence' 1 4 The canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterious leads one to conclude that because the
drafters of the ECPA specifically mentioned the words "wire" and "oral
communications" in section 2515, the words "electronic communications"
must have been intentionally omitted since such words would have been
included if that was what the legislature had intended.1 5 The ECPA seem-
ingly affords the greatest amount of privacy protection for aural transmis-
sions n1 6 (a type of transmission not encompassed in the definition of
"electronic communications"). The only remedy mentioned for an unau-
thorized interception or disclosure of an electronic communication is a civil
cause of action under section 2520.117
It would seem as though the ECPA, like many laws, has loopholes
which would curtail a user's privacy for purposes of standing under the
Fourth Amendment. The issue of whether a particular defendant has
standing to initiate a motion to suppress evidence will most likely have to be
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994).
113. Section 2515, entitled "Prohibition of use as evidence intercepted wire or oral com-
munications," states:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, departnent, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative com-
mittee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. See id.
115. The following canon should play a significant role in the interpretation of § 2515:
'Technical and legal words with special meanings are construed according to the technical,
legal, or special meaning appropriate to the context of the statute." JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS IN A NuTsHELL 311 (1986). This canon futher buttresses the argument that
the drafters intended "electronic communications" to be omitted from the scope of § 2515.
Accordingly, the meanings of the words electronic, oral, and wire communications, which are
"technical and legal words," should be treated the same throughout the ECPA. The words are
"technical" in the sense that they deal with highly particularized modes of communication.
They are "legal" because they must be construed within the meaning of a law, the ECPA.
Simply put, the ECPA does not explicitly, or even implicitly, authorize the suppression of an
electronic communication.
116. NETLAW, supra note 102, at 168.
117. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1994).
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resolved by resorting to the seminal Fourth Amendment cases discussed
above.n 8
HI. CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace is a globally networked, computer-sustained, com-
puter-accessed, and computer-generated, multi-dimensional, artifi-
cial, or "virtual" reality. In this world, on which every computer
screen is a window, actual, geographic distance is irrelevant. Ob-
jects seen or heard are neither physical nor, necessarily, presenta-
tions of physical objects, but are rather-in form, character, and
action-made up of data, pure information. This information is de-
rived in part from the operation of the natural, physical world, but
is derived primarily from the immense traffic of symbolic informa-
tion, images, sounds, and people, that constitute human enterprise
in science, art, business, and culture.119
Because there are so many different methods of accessing cyberspace,
various legal theories will apply to different factual scenarios. This note will
focus only on the potential legal pitfalls in the "public system" which
provides access to the general public as a whole. Such a system typically
includes a storage area in cyberspace where one can access his or her own
data and prevent others from retrieving it (through the use of a password).
Additionally, there are areas where all have access to the same information.
A system operator (also referred to as a "sysop") is one who heads the
particular online system. System operators who run these systems have the
ability to access one's "private" files but may or may not choose to do so. 120
Within the web of "public" cyberspace, there might also be some systems
existing which provide users limited access. In order to gain access to such a
system, a user might have to pay a fee or obtain approval from the system
operator who runs it.
A. Online Crime and Evidence of Crime Online
New societal conventions seem to go hand in hand with new forms of
crime. Even those who have never gone online know about the problems
118. See also Megan Connor Bertron, Note, Home Is Where Your Modem Is: An Appro-
priate Application of Search and Seizure Law to Electronic Mail, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 163
(1996).
119. M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGrrAL WORLD 29 (1995).
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with hackers in cyberspace.12 1 The word "hacker" was not in existence until
computers linked up with telecommunications.
Aside from hacking, various forms of computer crime now exist.
Criminals upload viruses in an attempt to destroy computer systems, steal
copyrighted material, and engage in the exchange of child pornography
amongst other things.'2 Private files exist which contain evidence of crime
occurring outside cyberspace (the dreaded physical world). 23 If police
"search" cyberspace, the question of standing to assert the illegality of
government conduct becomes pertinent.
B. Meet Stoney and Talley'24
In order to better understand how standing under the Fourth Amend-
ment works in conjunction with cyberspace, we will follow the exploits of
two fictional characters named Stoney and Talley. Stoney and Talley are
your stereotypical cyber-nerds who have a knack of getting into trouble
while surfing the net.
IV. Six HYPOThETCALS
A. The "Public" Chat Room
The Dean of Admissions at the newly-established Cyber Law Center
would ultimately regret rejecting Stoney and Talley to the class of 2000.
Upon receiving their e-mail rejections from the Cyber Law Center, Stoney
and Talley decided to discuss their options at the "Worms R' Us" site on the
web where all the expert hackers did their business.
Both entered the site from their computers at home and joined Public
Chat Room No. 3-a forum for disgruntled law school rejects. No password
or fee was required to join Public Chat Room No. 3. "All are Welcome"
blinked across the screen as they logged in. The top of the screen indicated
29 users who were currently in the room. Stoney and Talley bragged to all
who would listen about their detailed plot to upload a destructive worm into
the Cyber Law Center.
121. Id. at 141.
122. Id. at 187-208.
123. Id.
124. Professor Johnny C. Burns of Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center created these names for a hypothetical problem he distributed to his Criminal
Procedure class in the Summer of 1995.
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What Stoney and Talley couldn't know was that Officer Iago McFad-
den, a veteran of the Cleveland Police force, was masquerading online as
Earthworm Jim, a supposed world-famous hacker. Warrantless online
eavesdropping had become second nature to McFadden after the Cleveland
brass moved him behind a desk and off the streets of Ohio. McFadden-
downloaded the incriminating conversations to his computer and later
arrested Stoney and Talley for attempted computer tampering. At a pre-trial
conference, Stoney and Talley moved to suppress the evidence on grounds
that McFadden's search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Would Stoney and Talley have standing to assert the illegality of
Officer McFadden's search? Clearly they would not. Under Katz, neither
could have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the contents of
their communications because Public Chat Room No. 3 was open to the
public. They both had to know that anyone online could see what they were
saying. Assuming arguendo they did have an actual expectation of privacy,
they could not have standing under the objective prong of the Katz analysis.
Stoney and Talley knowingly exposed their conversation to the public. They
took no self-protective steps to ensure privacy, and had no indicia of control
to exclude others from the room. Furthermore, Hoffa tells us that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides information will not reveal it to the govern-
ment.125 Thus, it would appear that any expectation of privacy they might
have had would not be one which society would recognize as reasonable.
The ECPA is in accordance with such analysis as it provides for the lawful
interception of those electronic communications which are readily available
to the public. 26 Inherent within the concept of a public chat room is the
principle that everyone can see what everyone else is saying. It is therefore
impossible to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in public chat rooms.
B. The "Private" Chat Room
Same scenario as before, except this time: Stoney and Talley decide to
discuss their plot to destroy the Cyber Law Center in "The Worm Hole" a
"private')127 chat room and sub-cite of "Worms R' Us." Other users are
excluded from this area and may only view communications posted in the
public chat room. Only the "Worms R' Us" system operator can view
messages being transferred in private chat rooms like "The Worm Hole."
125. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
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Sysop Slug, the system operator for "Worms R' Us," configured her
system to store all messages passed online in both the public and private
chat rooms. It is common knowledge that system operators can view
messages stored in the computer and are capable of viewing live chat room
discussions as well.
Hot on the trail of Stoney and Talley and tired of his desk job, Eagle-
Eye McFadden takes to the streets and proceeds to (without a warrant)
shakedown Sysop Slug for any information she might have on the two
notorious hackers he'd been following. Reluctantly, Sysop Slug turns over
the information. Stoney and Talley are arrested and they move to suppress
the evidence McFadden gathered.
A few wrinkles develop in the previous hypothetical. First, when
Stoney and Talley entered into "The Worm Hole," their case for an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy becomes more plausible if they really
thought it was a "private" chat room. If both offer solid proof that they
thought their communications would not be read by anyone, including Sysop
Slug or eavesdropping hackers and users, it would be tough to overcome
their assertion of a subjective expectation of privacy. Standing in this
instance will (as it almost invariably does) turn on whether Stoney and
Talley had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Stoney and Talley will
contend that stepping into the "private" room constituted a self-protective
step sufficient to rise to the level of a reasonable expectation of privacy. By
doing so, they had dominion and control of their online conversation and had
the power to exclude others from viewing it.
A cursory inspection of the former argument might seem persuasive. In
fact, the Katz Court might have found a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver, however, it is generally under-
stood by society that system operators have access to monitor all areas
within their control and are truly considered the biggest threat to online
privacy.1 28 System operators fear potential raids by government agents
chasing cyber-criminals. 129 This fear prompts many system operators to
"reduce or eliminate user privacy on the system."'30
Assuming arguendo this sort of societal understanding is empirically
true, one cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a "private" chat
room under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver. If the possibility of snoops
rummaging through our garbage does not create a legitimate expectation of
privacy based on our common knowledge, it requires a simple extension of
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the Greenwood holding to argue that a sysop's control of users' data renders
an expectation of privacy illegitimate even in a "private" chat room when
society recognizes the existence of this type of sysop control.
Under the logic of the ECPA, because Sysop Slug configured her
system to automatically store messages, the interception and disclosure of
the contents of the electronic communications would fall beyond the periph-
eral protection of the ECPA since the ECPA only covers the interception of
communications "while in transmission." One must also consider the bite of
section 2515. According to that section, electronic communications cannot
be suppressed. 13' Thus, Sysop Slug's disclosure to Eagle Eye would be
authorized under the ECPA.
Greenwood would also seem to allow the admission of evidence
surreptitiously retrieved from deleted files or messages once found in a
"privte" chat room. Hackers would become the cyber-analog for the scaven-
gers and snoops. The deletion of a message or a file would serve as the
functional equivalent to taking out the garbage. If the government visited a
site and undeleted a file, the "owner" of that file could not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in it under the analysis of Greenwood.
Under the combined analysis of Katz and Hoffa, Stoney and Talley's
conversation would probably be treated as if they voluntarily disclosed
information to a third party because of the societal understanding concerning
sysop control. The system operator could not be considered the functional
equivalent of the telephone operator depicted in Katz. Whereas society
understands that Ma Bell will not listen in on our phone conversations, the
same cannot be said about system operators. Because of the growing fear
amongst system operators concerning government raids, they have elimi-
nated or severely curtailed user privacy. 132 Ergo, the telephone and system
operators are not the clear analogs one might think they are. This leads us to
an unsavory sort of conclusion: police could illegally search and seize the
system operator's stored data and use it against the system operator's
users-not the system operator herself. Such reasoning would be in tune
with the idea that "'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like
some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.
' 1 33
Stoney and Talley are not the "victims" of the illegal search, Sysop Slug
(under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence) is the only real victim.
Even laws which curb the system operator's ability to monitor a user's
communications would not, under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver, bear
131. See discussion supra Part II.E.
132. Id.
133. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-134.
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on whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of
standing jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment.134 Although the ECPA
provides for civil remedies under section 2520 for certain system operator
conduct which violates a user's privacy, Greenwood's rationale would seem
to lend credence to the argument that the ECPA could not provide an
individual with the legitimate expectation of privacy needed for standing. In
cyberspace this argument becomes even stronger upon analogizing from
Greenwood. The Court in Greenwood found that a state statute provided for
the use of the exclusionary rule when police illegally searched garbage. 135 In
the case of cyberspace and system operators, we are only dealing with a
statute which provides for civil remedies when the proscribed conduct
arises. 13 6 Further, the use of the exclusionary rule does not seem to apply to
electronic communications under the section 2515 and the basic canon of
expressio unius.13 7 If the statute in Greenwood would not provide a basis for
a legitimate expectation of privacy, a statute which dealt specifically with
the exclusion of evidence, then it is a small step in logic to argue that the
civil remedies set forth in section 2520 will not be sufficient insofar as one's
reasonable expectation of privacy is concerned. This argument is buttressed
by the fact that the exclusion of "electronic communications" is not provided
for in section 2515.
C. Electronic Mail
Stoney and Talley, now in separate jail cells awaiting trial, suffer
extreme withdrawal symptoms as they are without their portable laptops and
each other. Luckily for them, the kind-hearted and dim-witted Nurse
Hatchet takes pity on the two inmates and buys them both portable laptops
equipped with cellular modems.
Behind steel bars and beneath prison issued blankets, electronic
illuminesence brings smiles to the faces of Stoney and Talley. Being careful
not to enter into any sort of chat room, they dial into their "private" e-mail
accounts on Casablanca Online ("COL"), the largest public online service
in the United States.
134. Although the ECPA provides civil remedies for certain system operator conduct
which violates a user's privacy, under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver, the ECPA could not
provide an individual with a legitimate expectation of privacy. See supra notes 94-101 and
accompanying text.
135. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43-44.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
137. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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After entering in their passwords, each send detailed accounts of their
plan to break out of prison (which eclipse mere preparation and rise to the
level of perpetration under the law of criminal attempts) and take over
cyberspace. Other than the sysop, no one can access their e-mail accounts.
Stoney promised to advertise for COL in exchange for its promise not to
disclose any e-mail to anyone unless a properly executed search warrant
forced it to do so. Stoney and COL signed a legally binding contract
evidencing their promises. Talley was too lazy to make a similar contract
with COL.
With a gun and a smile, Officer McFadden asked the COL system
operator to turn over any messages stored in Stoney and Talley's e-mail
accounts. McFadden arrests Stoney and Talley and again they move to
suppress evidence at a pre-trial hearing.
As ridiculous as the above hypothetical is, the issue of standing remains
a difficult one. Do individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their e-mail accounts? While Officer McFadden certainly violated several
laws in the pursuit of the e-mail, Stoney and Talley must have standing to
assert the illegality of McFadden's actions. Though the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter police misconduct, 138 standing remains a prerequisite for a
motion to suppress evidence.
139
Do Stoney and Talley have standing to suppress their e-mail messages?
Under Katz and its progeny, both need subjective and objective expectations
of privacy. On a subjective level, it would probably be difficult to show that
neither had an actual expectation of privacy. This is especially true for
Stoney who contracted with COL for the express purpose of ensuring his
privacy. Is their expectation of privacy one which society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable? Both Stoney and Talley evidenced indicia of
control and the power to exclude with the use of their password. The
password could be thought of as the functional equivalent of the key in Jones
which the Court found to be very significant. However, unlike Jones, Stoney
and Talley "voluntarily disclosed" the contents of their e-mail to the sysop
by virtue of the societal understanding concerning the sysop/user relation-
ship. Any possessory interest one might have in their e-mail is contingent on
what the sysop decides to do with it. Thus, the power to exclude, tradition-
ally linked to property rights, is tenuous at best in the context of e-mail
communications. A legitimate expectation of privacy in this instance will
138. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 239.
139. See generally id. at 219.
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not flow from the possessory interest Stoney and Talley have in their
communications.
The contract Stoney had with COL is rendered meaningless under the
logic of Hoffa, Greenwood, and Oliver. The Fourth Amendment simply
does not provide protection for a wrongdoers misplaced belief in the trust-
worthiness of a third party. 14° A contract, like a law or statute, will not
create a legitimate expectation of privacy. 141 Stoney may try to sue COL for
breach of contract (though COL would have a solid duress defense), but that
would be his only mechanism for relief. The fact that Officer McFadden
grossly violated COL's rights is of no concern. "'Fourth Amendment rights
are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be
vicariously asserted. ' ,
142
On the other hand, Stoney might try to argue that his contract with COL
provided him with a legitimate expectation of privacy similar to that which a
tenant would have with his or her landlord. 143 Like a tenant or hotel guest, a
user who has a present possessory interest in the e-mail would have standing
to assert the illegality of a government search. Like the landlord-tenant
relationship, a system operator may not effectively consent to the search of
his user's e-mail communications. In fact, Stoney's contract with COL
explicitly states that COL may not divulge the contents of e-mail unless the
sysop is provided with a properly executed search warrant. Stoney may
contend that such a contract is the functional equivalent of the implicit
agreements between a landlord and her tenant, or a hotel and its guest, to not
let others in their homes or rooms. Therefore, such a contract would provide
Stoney with standing.
On the surface, this argument seems to be pretty convincing. However,
implicit within such an argument is the proposition that the sysop/user
relationship is analogous to the landlord-tenant relationship. In a landlord-
tenant relationship (or hotel-guest relationship) the government searches
homes or rooms. In cyberspace, the government searches for electronic data
stored in the sysop's computer. The difference in the place searched might
prove to be important. First, the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been
interpreted to afford the greatest protection to the home and similar dwell-
140. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
141. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); see
also supra note 94-101 and accompanying text.
142. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)).
143. Stoney might also argue that his situation is like that of the relationship between a
hotel/motel guest and manager. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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ings such as a hotel room.' 44 Can the storage area where electronic informa-
tion is kept logically be equated to a home? The type of activity which
occurs at an e-mail address is distinct from the intimate activity which
occurs at one's home (or hotel room). Second, a system operator may
monitor all activities associated with the e-mail address after they are stored
in her computer. 45 Conversely, a landlord or hotel manager cannot monitor
the activities of her tenant or guest without some sort of contract allowing
such monitoring. Clearly, the sysop's ability to monitor a user's e-mail
severely curtails any legitimate expectation of privacy. This second level of
differentiation would probably lead a court to conclude that a defendant in
such a situation would not have standing despite any contract. There is little
reason to think that electronic mail will be treated any differently from
"private" chat rooms.
D. The System Operator
In addition to communicating via e-mail that day, Stoney and Talley
decided to open up their own web-site and e-mail service. In order to access
their sites, a person needed a password and rejection letter from the Cyber
Law Center. As system operators, Stoney and Talley had complete dominion
and control over the accessibility of their site.
Officer McFadden surreptitiously hacks into Stoney and Talley's web
site and discovers pictures evidencing child pornography and bestiality in
violation of state law. Stoney and Talley move to suppress the evidence as a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
Here, Stoney and Talley would have standing to assert the illegality of
the search. They have a possessory interest in the website and the computer
which they share with no one else. The password protection evidences self-
protective steps which would rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy in
this example because no one else aside from Stoney and Talley can circum-
vent the password to glean information from their web-site. 46 Because
Stoney and Talley can choose who enters their site, they seem to have the
144. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (explaining the historical backdrop
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
145. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
146. One might question the truth of this statement considering that McFadden hacked
into Stoney and Talley's website. The difference here lies in the fact that the garbage was not
taken to the curbside. Greenwood is taken out of the equation, assuming files are not deleted
into Cyberspace. Here, it is unlikely that e-mail will be deleted into Cyberspace. Any
deletion should remain within the physical confines of the computer. See supra notes 94-101,
accompanying text, and discussion in Part IV.B.
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power to exclude which is important in attaining a legitimate expectation of
privacy. Stoney and Talley, as sysops, are direct victims of the illegal
search. Thus, system operators seemingly would have standing to assert the
illegality of police action when they take the self-protective steps required
under the Fourth Amendment.
E. Pen Register and Beeper Analogies
Hypothetically, if the police used a device to track where one travels in
cyberspace, there is no reason to think that the use of such technology would
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. When one travels along
the digital highway, such movements are knowingly exposed to the public
and merit no Fourth Amendment protection. The digital web where a user
journeys would be considered the functional equivalent of the public streets.
A cyber-beeper 47 or pen register would seem to comport with the Court's
analysis in Smith and Knotts. As long as a user travels along a public area in
cyberspace, where one can legally view their movements, cyber-tracking
devices would not constitute a search.
F. Data Encryption
While searching through the records of Stoney and Talley's conversa-
tions in the public chat room at Worms R' Us, Officer McFadden discovers
several lines of garbled text sent between Stoney and Talley. Stoney and
Talley encrypted the most detailed portions of their plan to destroy the
Cyber Law Center. Presently, there is no method to decrypt a message
unless one has the key to decode it. Stoney and Talley each memorized the
keys and have never written them down.
Encryption of data is the only surefire way to ensure privacy. 148 Only
those who have the key can decrypt an encoded message. Encrypted data
acts like an impenetrable bomb shelter. Nothing can break into it. It would
seem that the power to exclude others with this technology is absolute. That
being the case, it would seem one will always have standing to challenge the
illegality of a search or seizure of encrypted data. By definition, it is taken
out of the public view.
For every rule there is an exception. The United States government
created encryption software called the "Clipper." 149 Those who use Clipper
147. A cyber-beeper is a hypothetical label that this author is attaching to a device used to
track movement in cyberspace.
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encryption must be aware that the government holds the keys for decryption
in escrow with government agencies. 50 This factor would diminish one's
legitimate expectation of privacy. Further, if technology becomes available
to the public which would allow one to decrypt at will, then encryption will
become obsolete as a means for ensuring a legitimate expectation of privacy
under the rationale of Dow Chemical.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above analysis, it would seem that encryption of data is
the only way a user can attain a legitimate expectation of privacy for
purposes of standing under the Fourth Amendment. The system operator
can gain a legitimate expectation of privacy in cyberspace, but she must take
adequate self-protective steps equivalent to those outlined in Katz and its
progeny. Thus, the criminal defense attorney should advise her clients not to
store any information in cyberspace unless they would be willing to shout
out the same information in a crowded public theater.
"He looked up again at the portrait of Big Brother. The colossus that




151. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 244 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961). In Erich Fromm's after-
word to 1984, he crystallized the impetus this author had for altering the tense in one of the
last passages George Orwell wrote in 1984.
George Orwell's 1984 is the expression of a mood, and it is a warning. The
mood it expresses is that of near despair about the future of man, and the warning
is that unless the course of history changes, men all over the world will lose their
most human qualities, will become soulless automatons, and will not even be
aware of it.
Erich Fromm, Afterword to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961) (emphasis
added).
Unless the current state of the law changes (§ 2515 of the ECPA should be considered a
prime candidate for change), and the courts and Congress act with a keen eye toward learning
about the Internet, it is this author's opinion that that we will forever remain stuck in a sand
trap throughout the "course of history."
* The author would like to thank Professors Johnny C. Burris and Mark Dobson of the
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center for their insight, support, and
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